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Legal Ethics
by Patrick Emery Longan*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Between June 1, 2002, and June 1, 2003, the Georgia Court of Appeals
and the Georgia Supreme Court decided over two hundred cases
concerning legal ethics. Those cases included disciplinary cases against
lawyers, bar admission matters, claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in criminal cases, judicial discipline and disqualification, and
several miscellaneous matters involving clients and lawyers.
In
addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
decided one significant case involving judicial elections in Georgia.
II.
A.

DISCIPLINARY CASES

Trust Accounts and Other FinancialProblems

Lawyers in a variety of practice settings have occasion to handle other
people's money. One of the leading causes of attorney discipline is the
mishandling of client money, and this past year was no exception. Six
attorneys were disbarred for mishandling money belonging to others,
while one attorney received a twelve-month suspension.
Two attorneys were disbarred because they settled cases without client
authorization and converted the money to their own uses. In re Jones'
arose from one incident, while a different In re Jones2 involved ten

* Associate Dean, William Augustus Bootle Chair in Ethics and Professionalism in the
Practice of Law, Director of the Mercer Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism, Walter
F. George School of Law, Mercer University. Washington University (A.B., 1979);
University of Sussex (M.A., 1980); University of Chicago (J.D., 1983).
1. 275 Ga. 496, 569 S.E.2d 844 (2002).
2. 276 Ga. 111, 575 S.E.2d 508 (2003). This matter also involved an eleventh violation
in which the attorney converted a duplicate insurance check rather than return it to the
insurance company as he was supposed to do. Id. at 111, 575 S.E.2d at 508.
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cases. In In re Snead' and In re Burrell,4 two lawyers lost their
licenses because they absconded with money they received in trust at
real estate closings.5 Another lawyer, in In re Clarke,6 voluntarily
surrendered his license after he withdrew funds from an estate for which
he was the administrator and took for his own use a car that belonged
to the estate.7 In In re McFarland,' another attorney was disbarred
after she became an issuing agent for a title insurance company but
never accounted for the premiums that were paid to her.9 Finally, in In
re Cunningham,'0 an attorney received a twelve-month suspension after
he filed a Petition for Voluntary Discipline for commingling client funds
with his personal funds and "borrowing" money from the client's funds,
even though the client was repaid."
B.

Problems of Client Neglect and Abandonment

In the Georgia Supreme Court's 2002-2003 term, the court disciplined
numerous lawyers for neglect or abandonment of client matters. Some
of these cases involved multiple matters, while neglect ofjust one matter
was sufficient cause for discipline in a number of others.
Three cases displayed patterns of client abandonment, and all resulted
in disbarment. In re Dickson12 concerned an attorney who undertook
one divorce case and two post-conviction cases, did little or no work on
the matters, and in two of the three cases, kept the money that the
client paid up front. 3 In In re McDaniel, 4 another lawyer abandoned
six clients, kept $3500 retainers from two clients, and converted $13,500
belonging to one client for his own use. 5 Finally, in In re Broom," an
attorney was disbarred after abandoning clients in six personal injury

3.
4.
5.
S.E.2d
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

276 Ga. 278, 577 S.E.2d 592 (2003).
276 Ga. 112, 575 S.E.2d 508 (2003).
In re Snead, 276 Ga. at 278, 577 S.E.2d at 593; In re Burrell, 276 Ga. at 112, 575
at 509.
275 Ga. 814, 573 S.E.2d 81 (2002).
Id. at 815, 573 S.E.2d at 82.
275 Ga. 815, 573 S.E.2d 56 (2002).
Id. at 817, 573 S.E.2d at 58.
276 Ga. 400, 578 S.E.2d 892 (2003).
Id. at 400, 578 S.E.2d at 892.
275 Ga. 271, 565 S.E.2d 455 (2002).
Id. at 272, 565 S.E.2d at 456.
276 Ga. 226, 577 S.E.2d 275 (2003).
Id. at 227-28, 577 S.E.2d at 276.
276 Ga. 114, 575 S.E.2d 492 (2003).
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cases and one divorce case. 7 In five of these cases, Broom did nothing
to pursue the client's matter.'8
A number of other cases resulted in discipline for abandonment of a
single client. In re Strickland 9 and In re Quinlan21 concerned two
lawyers who were disbarred for neglecting bankruptcy matters entrusted
to them; in each case, the lawyer also took client money for the lawyer's
personal use. 2' Two other lawyers, in In re Burton2 and In re Eastham, 3 undertook to represent clients in criminal cases but abandoned
the clients and lost their licenses as a result.24 In In re Beal25 and
In re Eaton,6 lawyers with prior disciplinary history were disbarred for
neglecting civil cases 27 and in In re Shehane,28 a lawyer was dis-

barred for abandoning a client's civil claim and then lying about it to the
Investigative Panel.29 Two other lawyers were suspended for abandoning clients in civil cases. An attorney in In re Wallace3" was suspended
for two years for neglecting a case that had already been filed,3 and in
In re Luquire,32 an attorney was suspended
for one year for failing to
take any action on the client's behalf.3
C. Other DisciplinaryCases
The supreme court also decided a number of miscellaneous disciplinary
cases. These cases involved criminal activity by lawyers, reciprocal
discipline issues, the use of "runners," and deceptive actions by lawyers.

17. Id. at 114-17, 575 S.E.2d at 493-95.
18. Id. at 114-15, 575 S.E.2d at 493-94.
19. 276 Ga. 122, 575 S.E.2d 500 (2003).
20. 275 Ga. 273, 565 S.E.2d 457 (2002).
21. In re Strickland, 276 Ga. at 123-24, 575 S.E.2d at 501; In re Quinlan, 275 Ga. at
273-74, 565 S.E.2d at 457-58.
22. 276 Ga. 323, 578 S.E.2d 399 (2003).
23. 275 Ga. 813, 573 S.E.2d 78 (2002).
24. In re Burton, 276 Ga. at 324, 578 S.E.2d at 400; In re Eastham,275 Ga. at 813, 573
S.E.2d at 78-79.
25. 276 Ga. 214, 576 S.E.2d 882 (2003).
26. 275 Ga. 489, 569 S.E.2d 522 (2002). The court noted that a petition for voluntary
surrender of license is "tantamount to disbarment." Id. at 490, 569 S.E.2d at 523.
27. In re Beall, 276 Ga. at 215, 576 S.E.2d at 883; In re Eaton, 275 Ga. at 489, 569
S.E.2d at 523.
28. 276 Ga. 168, 575 S.E.2d 503 (2003).
29. Id. at 169, 575 S.E.2d at 504.
30. 275 Ga. 629, 571 S.E.2d 388 (2002).
31. Id., 571 S.E.2d at 389.
32. 275 Ga. 493, 569 S.E.2d 843 (2002).
33. Id. at 494, 569 S.E.2d at 844.
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The court dealt with cases involving criminal activity by lawyers. In
In re Rutherford,4 a lawyer's voluntary surrender of his license was
accepted after the lawyer pleaded guilty to three felony counts of
bribery.35 In In re Jackel,"6 a lawyer pleaded guilty to one count of
sexual battery and one count of solicitation of sodomy, both of which
arose from an attorney-client relationship, and the lawyer was disbarred.37

In In re Wyatt, 38 attorney Wyatt pleaded guilty in United

States District Court to knowingly aiding and abetting an alien
attempting to enter the United States by use of false and misleading
As part of Wyatt's probation, the federal court
representations.
prohibited him from practicing law for two years. Wyatt petitioned the
Georgia Supreme Court for a one-year suspension,3 9 and the court
granted it.4" Justices Hunstein, Thompson, and Hines dissented,
arguing that there was not enough information to determine exactly
what Wyatt had done and how Wyatt's criminal actions might have been
related to the practice of law.4' Finally, in In re Nelson,4 the court
lifted the suspension (after seven years) of a lawyer who had been
convicted of money laundering, but who had completed his term of
probation and shown remorse, and whose community presented evidence
of his personal character and professional competence.4 3
The supreme court also decided three cases involving reciprocal
discipline. In re Drumheller' concerned a Georgia lawyer who was
disbarred after he voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in
Virginia after he was accused by numerous clients of neglecting them
and failing to communicate with them.4 5 In In re Barrett,46 another
attorney was disbarred in Georgia after she surrendered her license in
Florida for "ethical misconduct."4" Barrett's misconduct included her
conviction in Florida of three counts of grand theft and one count of

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

275 Ga. 490, 569 S.E.2d 840 (2002).
Id. at 491, 569 S.E.2d at 841.
275 Ga. 568, 569 S.E.2d 835 (2002).
Id. at 568, 569 S.E.2d at 836.
275 Ga. 545, 570 S.E.2d 330 (2002).
Id. at 546, 570 S.E.2d at 330-31.
Id., 570 S.E.2d at 331.
Id. at 546-47, 570 S.E.2d at 331 (Hines, Hunstein, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
275 Ga. 491, 569 S.E.2d 841 (2002).
Id. at 493, 569 S.E.2d at 842.
276 Ga. 399, 578 S.E.2d 893 (2003).
Id. at 399, 578 S.E.2d at 893.
276 Ga. 279, 577 S.E.2d 771 (2003).
Id. at 279, 577 S.E.2d at 771.
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carrying a concealed firearm.' In re Craig49 concerned a lawyer who
was disbarred in Georgia after she consented to disbarment in South
Carolina for misappropriating client money and failing to communicate
with clients, failing to obey a court order, and failing to cooperate with
disciplinary counsel's office. 5 °
Two lawyers were disciplined for paying a non-lawyer organization,
Professional Management, Inc., for the referral of personal injury clients.
In In re Robbins,5 an attorney was disbarred for giving a non-lawyer
cash to deliver to "runners" who would secure personal injury clients for
the lawyer.52 The non-lawyer received twenty-five percent of any fee
the attorney realized from this arrangement. The lawyer had a lengthy
prior record of discipline.53 In the other case, In re Barnes, 4 a lawyer
petitioned for a voluntary three-year suspension for paying Professional
Management to refer personal injury clients.55 The court granted that
petition, although Justices Hunstein and Thompson dissented and
argued disbarment was appropriate.5"
Finally, two lawyers received one-year suspensions for different types
of deceptive behavior. In In re Toler,57 a lawyer submitted to a judge
a conflict letter stating inaccurately that he was a sole practitioner. The
falsity of the letter must have become obvious when the lawyer's
associate appeared for him in court. Meanwhile, the lawyer's secretary
had submitted a second conflict letter falsely stating that the lawyer
would be in municipal court that morning.5" The judge held a hearing
and found the lawyer in contempt.59 In re Vaughn6" concerned a
lawyer who failed to record a deed to secure debt. Rather than confess
the failure to the client, the attorney photocopied a file stamp from the
clerk's office and sent the "file-stamped" document to his client.6 The
Special Master recommended a six-month suspension, but the supreme
court suspended the lawyer for a year.6 2 Justice Benham dissented,

48. Id.
49. 276 Ga. 225, 576 S.E.2d 862 (2003).
50. Id. at 225, 576 S.E.2d at 862.
51. 276 Ga. 124, 575 S.E.2d 501 (2003).
52. Id. at 124-25, 575 S.E.2d at 502.
53. Id.
54. 275 Ga. 812, 573 S.E.2d 80 (2002).
55. Id. at 812, 573 S.E.2d at 81.
56. Id. at 812-13, 573 S.E.2d at 81 (Hunstein and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
57. 276 Ga. 228, 576 S.E.2d 898 (2003).
58. Id. at 229, 576 S.E.2d at 898.
59. Id.
60. 275 Ga. 295, 565 S.E.2d 463 (2002).
61. Id. at 295, 565 S.E.2d at 463.
62. Id. at 296, 565 S.E.2d at 464.
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stating the Special Master had a rational basis for recommending only
a six-month suspension because of the personal circumstances under
which the lawyer was operating and because the client was not harmed
by the lawyer's deception. 3
III.

BAR ADMISSIONS

The supreme court decided four cases concerning admission to the
State Bar. The first case, In re Singh,64 concerned an applicant's
complaint about the way the bar exam grade is computed. Under the
supreme court's Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law65 an
applicant must have a score of 270 to pass the bar exam.6 6 The score
is computed by adding the "scaled" scores of the Multistate Bar Exam
(MBE), the Multistate Performance Test (MPT), and the essay questions
prepared by the Georgia Board of Law Examiners. 7 Singh received a
scaled score of 126.95 on the MPT/Essay part of the exam and a scaled
score of 143.32 on the MBE. The sum of those two numbers is 270.27,
enough for a passing grade, but Singh encountered a problem. Since the
1980s, the Office of Bar Admissions (OBA) has rounded the MBE scaled
score for every examinee. Singh's rounded MBE score was 143, making
his final score just under 270.68 In light of the OBA's historical practice
and the expert opinion of the Director of Research for the National
Conference of Bar Examiners, the supreme court concluded that the
term "scaled score" in the Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of
Law includes a rounded, scaled score.69 The Board of Bar Examiners,
therefore, acted within the Rules when it concluded that Singh had not
passed the bar examination.7 °
Another bar exam problem arose in In re Goodman.71 The applicant
received a poor grade on the MPT and "surmised" that it must have been
because of his poor handwriting. The applicant asked the Board of Bar
Examiners to transcribe his scrawled answers and regrade them. 2

63.
64.

Id. at 296-97, 565 S.E.2d at 464-65 (Benham, J., dissenting).
276 Ga. 288, 576 S.E.2d 899 (2003).

65.

SUPREME COURT OF GEORGIA RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF

LAW available at http-//www2.state.ga.us/courts/bar/pdf/ruleslO.pdf (last visited Sept. 2,
2003) [hereinafter RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION].
66. In re Singh, 276 Ga. at 288, 576 S.E.2d at 899 (citing RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 65, at Part B, § 8(a)).
67. Id.
68. Id., 576 S.E.2d at 899-900.
69. Id. at 290, 576 S.E.2d at 900.
70. Id.
71. 276 Ga. 518, 578 S.E.2d 884 (2003).
72. Id. at 518, 578 S.E.2d at 884.
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Georgia's Rules Governing Admission to the Practice of Law forbid
regrading of exam answers after the general release of grades,7" and
the supreme court concluded that re-reading the typed answers of this
applicant would be regrading his exam.74 The court, therefore, denied
the applicant's request. 75 The court also warned future applicants not
to complain that their handwriting must have been the cause of their
failing grade, because "implicit in the requirement that applicants
handwrite a portion of their bar examinations is the requirement that
examiners to
any handwritten answers be sufficiently legible for bar
76
answer."
the
of
substance
the
on
based
assign a grade
The court also decided two character and fitness cases during the
survey period. In In re Lee,77 the applicant pleaded guilty in 1998 to
six counts of the unauthorized practice of law. 78 Although the applicant paid his fine and completed the terms of his probation, the court
concluded that he had not borne his burden to show that he was
rehabilitated.79 In particular, the applicant failed to show remorse for
his conduct, and he failed to show rehabilitation, having sued the lawyer
and the investigator who brought the unauthorized practice of law
charges. 8' Rehabilitation requires more than compliance with the law,
and the court denied the request for a certification of fitness to
practice.8 1 In In re Allen,82 an attorney was denied a certification of
fitness because he was the subject of disciplinary action by the Florida
Bar and because he did not demonstrate candor or a sense of accountability about that disciplinary action.8 3
IV.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

As usual, the appellate courts in Georgia reviewed dozens of claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases during the survey
period. Most claims were denied with little discussion, including
Zinnamon v. State,84 in which the defense lawyer was suspended from

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

RuLES GOVERNING ADMISSION, supra note 65, Part B, § 13.
276 Ga. at 518, 578 S.E.2d at 884-85.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 885.
Id.
275 Ga. 763, 571 S.E.2d 720 (2002).
Id. at 763, 571 S.E.2d at 720.
Id. at 764, 571 S.E.2d at 721.
Id.
Id.
275 Ga. 818, 573 S.E.2d 79 (2002).
Id. at 818, 573 S.E.2d at 79-80.
261 Ga. App. 170, 582 S.E.2d 146 (2003).
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practice at the time of Zinnamon's trials5 and Shiver v. State, 6 in
which the defense lawyer was later disbarred for unrelated reasons.8 7
Burgess v. State,"8 Bates v. State, 9 Phillips v. State,90 Talbot v.
State,9 1 and Emilio v. State92 were remanded for hearings on the
claims of ineffective assistance. In seven cases, the ineffective assistance
claims were granted,93 while two claims were denied only over vigorous
dissents.94
A.

Claims of Ineffective Assistance Granted

1. Asleep at the Switch. Four convictions were overturned because
defense counsel did not recognize obvious opportunities for their clients
to avoid conviction or other prejudice. One of these cases came from the
Supreme Court of Georgia. In Nelson v. Hall,95 the defendant had been
convicted of kidnapping with bodily injury, among other things.
However, at trial the jury received an erroneous instruction that omitted
the need to find bodily injury before convicting the defendant of
kidnapping with bodily injury. The defendant would have been entitled
to have that part-of his conviction reversed, but defense counsel failed
to enumerate this issue on appeal.96 Because the error was one that no
reasonable attorney should have made, and because the outcome of the
defendant's appeal certainly would have been different, the court
concluded that the defendant was entitled to have his petition for a writ
of habeas corpus granted.97

85. Id. at 172, 582 S.E.2d at 148.
86. 276 Ga. 624, 581 S.E.2d 254 (2003).
87. Id. at 626, 581 S.E.2d at 256.
88. 276 Ga. 185, 576 S.E.2d 863 (2003).
89. 275 Ga. 862, 572 S.E.2d 550 (2002).
90. 275 Ga. 595, 571 S.E.2d 361 (2002)
91. 261 Ga. App. 12, 581 S.E.2d 669 (2003).
92. 257 Ga. App. 49, 570 S.E.2d 372 (2002).
93. Nelson v. Hall, 275 Ga. 792, 573 S.E.2d 42 (2002); Shabazz v. State, 259 Ga. App.
339, 577 S.E.2d 45 (2003); Turner v. State, 259 Ga. App. 902, 578 S.E.2d 570 (2003); Blovin
v. State, 255 Ga. App. 788, 567 S.E.2d 39 (2002); Head v. Thomason, 276 Ga. 434, 578
S.E.2d 426 (2003); Heath v. State, 258 Ga. App. 612, 574 S.E.2d 852 (2002); Guzman v.
State, 260 Ga. App. 689, 580 S.E.2d 654 (2003).
94. Braithwaite v. State, 275 Ga. 884, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002); Woods v. State, 275 Ga.
844, 573 S.E.2d 394 (2002).
95. 275 Ga. 792, 573 S.E.2d 42 (2002).
96. Id. at 792-93, 573 S.E.2d at 42-43.
97. Id. Nelson presented an odd, if not unique, case on the necessity of finding harm
from his counsel's ineffective assistance. The outcome of his appeal would have been
different because of the erroneous jury instruction. His sentence, however, probably would
be the same because he was sentenced as a recidivist. A conviction for simple kidnapping
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Three other such cases came from the court of appeals. The sixteenyear-old defendant in Shabazz v. State9" was permitted by his counsel
to plead guilty, resulting in a twenty-year prison sentence for what the
prosecutor described in court as committing incest with his stepsister.
The problem his counsel overlooked was that it is not incest to have sex
with your stepsister. 99 The court of appeals permitted Shabazz to
withdraw his guilty plea due to ineffective assistance of counsel;'0 0 his
counsel failed to recognize that the State had not articulated a legally
sufficient factual basis for the plea.' 01 With similar passivity, defense
counsel in Turner v. State °2 remained silent while a prosecutor used
a conviction from another state at a sentencing hearing without giving
the notice required by law.10 3 The court of appeals found that defense
counsel's silence was ineffective assistance of counsel because it led to
a longer sentence.'O° Finally, in Blouin v. State"5 the court of appeals overturned John Blouin's conviction for selling cocaine because
Blouin's defense lawyer "just didn't think about" using the transcript of
testimony from a witness stating Blouin was not the one who sold the
drugs. 0 6 The lawyer knew about the transcript and knew that only
one witness testified that the seller was Blouin.' °7 The court concluded that the failure to obtain and use the transcript "was the equivalent
forgetting to call a key witness" and reversed the convicof simply
8
0

tion.1

2. Lack of Diligence. In three cases, Georgia courts held that
attorneys rendered ineffective assistance by not doing enough for their
clients. Head v. Thomason °9 was a death penalty case heard by the
supreme court. Gary Thomason was convicted in a bench trial of
murdering a homeowner who interrupted Thomason's burglary of the
victim's home."0 At the sentencing hearing, Thomason's mitigation

rather than kidnapping with bodily injury still would have been enough to trigger the
recidivist sentencing. Id.
98. 259 Ga. App. 339, 577 S.E.2d 45 (2003).
99. Id. at 339, 577 S.E.2d at 46; see O.C.G.A. § 16-6-22(a)(3) (1999).
100. Shabazz, 259 Ga. App. at 340, 577 S.E.2d at 46.
101. Id. at 339, 577 S.E.2d at 47.
102. 259 Ga. App. 902, 578 S.E.2d 570 (2003).
103. Id. at 903, 578 S.E.2d at 571.
104. Id.
105. 255 Ga. App. 788, 567 S.E.2d 39 (2002).
106. Id. at 790, 567 S.E.2d at 41-42.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. 276 Ga. 434, 578 S.E.2d 426 (2003).
110. Id. at 434, 578 S.E.2d at 428.
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evidence "consisted only of Thomason's profession of remorse, his lack of
violent tendencies, testimony that he was easily influenced and was
always with someone else when he got in trouble, and his mother's
mention of his hospitalization at Charter Peachford Hospital for
marijuana usage.""'
The judge sentenced Thomason to death.
Thomason brought 1 1a2 habeas action, and the trial court ordered a new
trial on sentencing.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's habeas decision.'
The
court was particularly concerned that defense counsel did not call any
expert witnesses at the sentencing hearing, although two were known
to him." 4 The first expert witness was a clinical psychologist who had
already testified, at a competency hearing, that the defendant had an IQ
of 77. The other was a psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant and
concluded that the defendant suffered from intellectual impairment, low
self-esteem, and depression. When the trial court refused to authorize
the payment of $25,000 for mental health experts, however, defense
counsel gave up. He never gave the psychiatrist the relevant school and
medical records, and he never tried to make a less expensive arrange15
ment with the expert, or another expert, to testify at the sentencing.
The court concluded that "given the importance of mitigating evidence
in death penalty cases,... an attorney has not acted reasonably when
he fails to call mental health experts he knows have mitigating evidence
and explains his failure to present lay mitigating evidence by asserting
that he had no experts to call."11
The court of appeals decided two cases in which the defense counsel's
lack of diligence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. In Heath
v. State,"7 a case later reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court, the
defendant was involved in a head-on collision and was charged with
fifteen counts of serious injury by vehicle, two counts of driving under
the influence of alcohol, and one count of reckless driving. The

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 435, 578 S.E.2d at 428.
Id. at 435-36, 578 S.E.2d at 428-29.
Id. at 434, 578 S.E.2d at 428.
Id. at 435, 578 S.E.2d at 429-30.
Id., 578 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 437, 578 S.E.2d at 430. The court's opinion in this case predated a similar

holding from the United States Supreme Court. In Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527
(2003), the Court held that a defendant who had been sentenced to death had received
ineffective assistance of counsel in the sentencing phase. Id. at 2542-43. The Court relied
specifically on the failure of the defense lawyers to commission a report from a forensic
social worker when the lawyers knew that the defendant's life history likely would
constitute persuasive mitigating evidence. Id. at 2536-37.
117.

258 Ga. App. 612, 574 S.E.2d 852 (2002).
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defendant told his public defender that he could not remember the
accident, and that a co-worker might have been driving.118 The lawyer
made no effort to find this co-worker and, according to a family member,
defense counsel
told [him] that he had so many cases on his load, that if he looked into
every nook and cranny that there was to this case, that he would never
get anything done, and that [the defendant] was nothing but a drunk,
9
... and that his only option.., was to say that he was guilty.
Also, the lawyer did not research whether the victims' injuries fit the
definition of "serious" in the relevant statute (the provisions of which the
lawyer could not recall), and the lawyer did not consult with his client
for the thirteen months between arraignment and the guilty plea.12 °
The court concluded that this representation was "tantamount to no
representation."12 1 The court applied a "presumption of prejudice" to
the case because of the disgraceful quality of the representation. 122
This was the first time a Georgia court applied such a presumption in
a non-capital case. 123 It was on this point that the supreme court
reversed the court of appeals. 24
In Guzman v. State, 25 the defendant was convicted of burglary after
he entered a neighbor's apartment in a confused state of mind. The
defendant had never been in trouble before and had a history of
"confusional migraines" that could have caused his behavior and his
appearance the night he was arrested; this evidence would have negated
the criminal intent necessary to convict him.'26 Defense counsel had
twenty-five pages of medical records to substantiate the condition but
sought improperly, and unsuccessfully, to introduce the records through
the defendant's testimony. The lawyer did not try to contact the
defendant's doctor or obtain records from other facilities that had treated
the defendant. 2 ' Because of the lawyer's lack of effort with respect to
a crucial factual issue that would have exonerated the defendant, the

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 615, 574 S.E.2d at 854.
Id.
Id. at 615-16, 574 S.E.2d at-854-55.
Id. at 612, 574 S.E.2d at 852-53.
Id., 574 S.E.2d at 853.
Id. at 616, 574 S.E.2d at 855.
See State v. Heath, S03G0528, 2003 LEXIS 943 (Ga. Nov. 10, 2003).
260 Ga. App. 689, 580 S.E.2d 654 (2003).
Id. at 692, 580 S.E.2d at 657.
Id. at 691-93, 580 S.E.2d at 656-57.
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court of appeals held that the lawyer's 12assistance
had been ineffective,
8
and it reversed defendant's conviction.
B.

Claims of Ineffective Assistance Rejected Over Dissent

A majority of the supreme court rejected a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel in Braithwaite v. State,'129 but the opinion drew
a stinging dissent from Justices Hunstein, Benham, and Thompson.'
The defendant was tried for his participation in a triple murder in 1996.
The principal witnesses against him were two alleged accomplices and
his ex-wife.'
At the beginning of closing arguments, the prosecutor
made the following remarks:
Two 18-year-old kids, sleeping in their house, never done anything
wrong, not bothering anybody, engaged to be married, recent graduates
from high school, both working promising careers, maybe college.
What must it have been like to be in that bedroom, minding your own
business when five men come in there, order you get down face first?
Do you scream? Well, they couldn't do that because they'd stuffed
socks in their mouth. Do you fight back? These men have guns. What
must it be like laying there next to the man you love, your face covered
up so you can't see but you can hear everything? What must it be like
when that first shot was fired into Eddie Fleming's [sic] back and she's
laying there right next to him? And he can still talk. He can still
move his head and she has to sit there and listen. And then they wait.
And what must it be like while the men are deciding who the next shot
is going to be fired from? She's laying there waiting. The blood is
pouring out of Eddie's back, who's right next to her. The men decide.
A second shot is fired-she's inches away from it-into the head of
Eddie McMillian. What must it have been like for Eddie McMillian as
he lay paralyzed? And then what was it like when Nekeba Turner as
she lay there waiting for her turn to die? . . . What was it like for

Chauncey Fleming as he lay there all tied up listening to his friends
being killed knowing his turn is coming? And one last piece of
worthless metal takes Chauncey's life. I mean the last images anybody
has of him is laying there tied up at the ankles and the arms and
around the head. And what must it be like to be Eddie McMillian's
mother and find those bodies?13'

128. Id. at 696, 580 S.E.2d at 659.
129. 275 Ga. 884, 572 S.E.2d 612 (2002).

130. Id. at 896, 572 S.E.2d at 622 (Benham, Hunstein, and Thompson, JJ., dissenting).
131. Id. at 884-85, 572 S.E.2d at 615.
132. Id. at 893-94, 572 S.E.2d at 621.
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This type of argument, which asks members of the jury to place
133
themselves in the position of a victim or a party, is impermissible.
It is a "golden rule" argument, and it is not allowed because it asks
jurors to abdicate their independence."
Braithwaite's counsel did not
object to the argument. His failure to object waived any direct complaint
about the prosecutor's closing argument.1 3 5 The surviving issue was
whether the failure to 136object was so egregious that it made the lawyer's
assistance ineffective.
The majority concluded that Braithwaite was not the victim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, even though it recognized that the
closing was an improper "golden rule" argument.3 7 The court reasoned that his counsel's decision not to object, ostensibly because the
objection would draw the jury's attention to the argument, was a
reasonable tactical choice for the lawyer to make. 3 8 The court also
concluded that, even if the decision not to object was unreasonable, there
was no harm to Braithwaite because the evidence against him was
overwhelming.3 9 Braithwaite could not carry his burden to show that,
but for his lawyer's failure to object during closing argument, there was
a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted. 40 For
both of these reasons, the majority rejected the claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. 141
The dissent disagreed on both counts. First, Justice Hunstein's
opinion concluded that "trial counsel's decision to remain silent in the
face of the prosecutor's prolonged and egregious golden rule argument
was a decision no reasonable defense counsel would have made under
the same circumstances." 4 2 Second, the dissent rejected the claim that
the argument did not matter, noting that the "overwhelming" evidence
against Braithwaite consisted of accomplice testimony and the testimony
of the defendant's estranged wife, who had had a sexual relationship
with one of the accomplices and could have learned the details of the

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 894, 572 S.E.2d at 621.
at 895, 572 S.E.2d at 622.
at 886, 572 S.E.2d at 615-16.
at 887, 572 S.E.2d at 616.

138. Id. at 886, 572 S.E.2d at 615-16.
139.

Id., 572 S.E.2d at 616.

140. Id. at 885, 572 S.E.2d at 615. The two-prong standard for assessing whether
counsel was so ineffective that a new trial is necessary comes from Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Id. at 885 n.6, 572 S.E.2d at 615 n.6.
141. Id. at 886, 572 S.E.2d at 616.
142. Id. at 896, 572 S.E.2d at 622 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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The
crime from the accomplice rather than from her husband."
dissent concluded by noting that, as a matter of policy, it would be better
to overturn this conviction to send a message to prosecutors that golden
be tolerated.'" Nevertheless, Braithwaite's
rule arguments will not
14
conviction was upheld.'

The court also rejected a number of claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel in Woods v. State.'46 The State's theory of the case was that
the defendant, along with a co-defendant, Antonio Brown, murdered
Brian Palmer. Woods allegedly shot the victim in Brown's presence, and
Brown helped conceal the crime. Woods was found guilty and sentenced
to life imprisonment.' 47 Woods raised a number of claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, but the one that provoked dissent was that the
same attorney represented both Woods and Brown." Comment Seven
to Rule 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct states that
"[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple defendants in a criminal case is so grave that ordinarily a lawyer should
decline to represent more than one codefendant." 4 9 Woods's defense
counsel nevertheless undertook to represent both Woods and Brown.
After their convictions, Brown's motion for new trial was granted
because Brown received ineffective assistance of counsel."' Woods was
not so fortunate. 15
The majority concluded that Woods actually benefited from the conflict
of interest."12 In particular, defense counsel insisted during plea
negotiations on the same "deal" for both defendants, even though the
evidence indicated that Woods was more culpable." 3 Also, trial
counsel tried to persuade the jury that both defendants were in Florida
By taking that approach, counsel
at the time of the murder."'
sacrificed a potential defense for Brown-mere presence at the scene-that
would have undermined Woods's defense."' If anyone was sold down

143. Id. at 898, 572 S.E.2d at 624.
144. Id. at 900-01, 572 S.E.2d at 625.
145. Id. at 889, 572 S.E.2d at 618.
146. 275 Ga. 844, 573 S.E.2d 394 (2002).
147. Id. at 844, 573 S.E.2d at 396.
148. Id. at 851, 573 S.E.2d at 401.
149. GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available at http://www.gabar.org/par
tiv.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
150. 275 Ga. at 845, 573 S.E.2d at 397 n.2.
151. Id. at 850, 573 S.E.2d at 400.
152. Id. at 845, 573 S.E.2d at 397.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 845-46, 573 S.E.2d at 397.
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the river, it was Brown. Brown got a new trial, but according to the
majority, Woods was not entitled to one. 56
Chief Justice Fletcher dissented in an opinion joined by Justice
Sears. 57 The dissent pointed out two ways that the conflict of interest
hurt Woods.15 First, defense counsel's attempt to negotiate identical
plea agreements actually hurt Woods because counsel's only offer was to
release the defendants for time served. 59 Counsel might have refused
to negotiate a longer sentence because to do so would have been unfair
to Brown, who may have merely been present at the murder. 6 °
Counsel, free of loyalty to Brown, might have been able to reach a less
lenient plea agreement on behalf of Woods, which still could have
avoided a life sentence. 6 ' Second, there was evidence that Brown,
rather than Woods, might have been the shooter. 62 Counsel did not
exploit this evidence to Woods's advantage, presumably because of his
loyalty to Brown." In the end, however, Brown received a new trial
and Woods did not." The collective judgment of the Georgia courts
was that trial counsel's assistance was ineffective for Brown but effective
for Woods.' 65
V.

JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE, DISQUALIFICATION, AND FREE SPEECH

The appellate courts in Georgia decided one case involving removal of
ajudge from office and numerous cases involving judicial disqualification
or recusal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
also decided a significant case about free speech in judicial elections in
Georgia.
A.

JudicialDiscipline
In In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge,'66 the Georgia Supreme Court
permanently removed Joseph Hammill as the Chief Magistrate of the
Glynn County Judicial Circuit.'6 7 Although the Judicial Qualifications
Commission had recommended that Judge Hammill be suspended for six
156.
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160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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167.

Id.
Id. at 851, 573 S.E.2d at 401 (Fletcher, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 852, 573 S.E.2d at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845-46, 573 S.E.2d at 397-98.
Id. at 850, 573 S.E.2d at 401.
275 Ga. 404, 566 S.E.2d 310 (2002).
Id. at 404, 566 S.E.2d at 310.
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months, the supreme court found that he should be removed for
incompetence, for failing to maintain the decorum and dignity of judicial
office, and for failing to respect and comply with the law.'
The judge
demonstrated incompetence when he ordered one citizen to pay a fine
without notice or hearing, assessed damages against a defendant without
notice or hearing, and ordered a warrantless search of another citizen's
home.1"9 The judge failed to maintain appropriate decorum when he
told an applicant for a restraining order that, "if [the alleged offender]
kills you, we'll get him."17 ° Judge Hammill also told a defendant that
the defendant had "shit for brains," and Hammill reassured an older
black man that his community service would not "be outdoors doing
physical labor like picking cotton."' 7' The judge demonstrated his
indifference to the law when, while he was a municipal court judge, he
wrote approximately forty-five checks that were returned for insufficient
funds.' 72 For all of these reasons, Judge Hammill was removed from
office immediately and permanently.'
B.

JudicialDisqualification

1. Procedural Issues. Motions to recuse or disqualify judges in
Georgia must be made in writing, filed timely, and accompanied by one
or more affidavits that support the motion.'7 4 Four cases failed to
meet these procedural hurdles. In Carter v. State,'75 a case involving
several ordinance violations, the defendant filed written motions to
recuse the trial judge because the judge was a defendant in a federal
civil action. The motion neither offered any evidence in support of the
assertion nor any argument about why, if true, that fact would require
recusal."7 ' The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of the
motion to recuse.'77 In Brewer v. Waldroup,"7 ' one party's attorney
appeared in court late and learned that judgment had already been
entered. The attorney asked the court to vacate its judgment and
alleged that she had spoken to the judge about her need to be in another
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169.
170.
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173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id.
Id. at 408-09, 566 S.E.2d at 313.
Id. at 410, 566 S.E.2d at 314.
Id.
Id. at 411, 566 S.E.2d at 315.
Id. at 413, 566 S.E.2d at 316.
GA. SUPER. CT. R. 25.1-25.2.
259 Ga. App. 798, 578 S.E.2d 508 (2003).
Id. at 802, 578 S.E.2d at 512.
Id.
259 Ga. App. 479, 578 S.E.2d 139 (2003).
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court the morning of trial. The attorney moved to recuse the judge
because the judge, who denied being informed of the other case, had
become a material witness.'7 9 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision that the motion was neither timely made nor supported
by the requisite affidavits.18 ° Similarly, in BITT International,Inc. v.
Fletcher,8 ' the court of appeals affirmed a trial judge who refused to
recuse himself for allegedly exhibiting bias in favor of a party, when no
motion to recuse was filed."8 2 Finally, in Dodson v. Dean,8 ' the
court of appeals upheld the denial of a motion to recuse when the motion
was late, and the purported "affidavits" were not notarized.'
The previous three cases presented an additional procedural issue.
The parties seeking recusal in each case argued that the procedural
defects of the motion should not matter because the judge was required
to recuse himself sua sponte.'l 5 Canon 3(E) of the Georgia Code of
Judicial Conduct 8 6 contains a general rule that "j]udges shall disqualify themselves in any proceeding in which their impartiality might
reasonably be questioned,"8 7 and then lists specific, non-exclusive
circumstances in which this general statement would apply.'
For
example, a judge who has personally served as a lawyer in the case must
recuse himself.8 9 The argument for sua sponte recusal is that if one
of the specific circumstances listed in Canon 3(E) applies, then it is
reversible error for the judge not to recuse himself, even if the aggrieved
party does not follow the procedures of Rule 25.190 This argument
failed in BITT International and Dodson because the parties were
seeking recusal only under the general standard that the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.' 9' Both cases implied,
however, that the argument might succeed if the basis for the recusal

179. Id. at 479, 578 S.E.2d at 141.
180. Id. at 481-82, 578 S.E.2d at 142.
181. 259 Ga. App. 406, 577 S.E.2d 276 (2003).
182. Id. at 409-10, 577 S.E.2d at 281-82.
183. 256 Ga. App. 4, 567 S.E.2d 348 (2002).
184. Id. at 7, 567 S.E.2d at 350.
185. Brewer, 259 Ga. App. at 481, 578 S.E.2d at 142; BITT Int'l, 259 Ga. App. at 409,
577 S.E.2d at 281; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 7, 567 S.E.2d at 350.
186. GEORGIA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, GA. CT. AND BAR. R., available at
http'//www.gabar.org/judcondt.asp (last visited Aug. 20, 2003).
187. Id. at Canon 3(E)(1).
188. Id. at Canon 3(E)(1)(a), (b).
189. Id. at Canon 3(E)(1)(b).
190. Brewer, 259 Ga. App. at 481, 578 S.E.2d at 142.
191. BITTInt'l, 259 Ga. App. at 409-10, 577 S.E.2d at 281; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 6,
567 S.E.2d at 350.
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had been one of the specific triggers in Canon 3(E). 192 Nevertheless,
in Brewer, where the party did assert one of those circumstances-the
personal knowledge by the judge of disputed evidentiary facts-the court
of appeals held the motion to be procedurally barred.'93 The appellate
courts eventually will need to reach a consistent resolution of the
interplay between the procedural requirements of Rule 25 and the
standards of Canon 3(E).
2. Decisions on the Merits. The Georgia Court of Appeals decided
six cases that touched on the merits of motions to recuse. In Ellis v.
Stanford,'94 the estranged wife of the mayor of Macon refused to
vacate the home that she and her husband had agreed to sell. She
sought to have the judge disqualified because the mayor previously
appointed the judge to a diversity committee composed of eighty
members. 9 5 The court held that the connection did not call the judge's
impartiality into question."' In a condemnation case, Ware v. Henry
County Water & Sewerage Authority,97 the Special Master was
compensated as a judge pro tem of a juvenile court over which one of the
other party's lawyer presided on a part-time basis.'98 The court of
appeals concluded this connection was not evidence of bias so severe that
the parties could not get a fair hearing.' 99
In Wise v. State" and Moody v. State,2"' the court of appeals held
that the judges had recused themselves unnecessarily but the reversals
did not invalidate rulings made earlier in the cases.2 °2 The court in
Head v. Brown203 upheld the decision of a trial judge to recuse himself
when the judge learned that his former law firm held an attorney's lien
against the insurance company for one of the parties. °4 Finally, in
Williams v. State,"5 the court of appeals concluded that a trial judge

192. BITTInt'l, 259 Ga. App. at 409-10, 577 S.E.2d at 281; Dodson, 256 Ga. App. at 7,
567 S.E.2d at 350-51.
193. 259 Ga. App. at 481-82, 578 S.E.2d at 142.
194. 256 Ga. App. 294, 568 S.E.2d 157 (2002).
195. Id. at 295, 568 S.E.2d at 159.
196. Id. at 296, 568 S.E.2d at 160.
197. 258 Ga. App. 778, 575 S.E.2d 654 (2002).
198. Id. at 778, 575 S.E.2d at 657.
199. Id. at 781-82, 575 S.E.2d at 659.
200. 257 Ga. App. 211, 570 S.E.2d 656 (2002).
201. 256 Ga. App. 65, 567 S.E.2d 709 (2002).
202. Wise, 257 Ga. App. at 213-14, 570 S.E.2d at 660; Moody, 256 Ga. App. at 67, 567
S.E.2d at 711-12.
203. 259 Ga. App. 855, 578 S.E.2d 559 (2003).
204. Id. at 859, 578 S.E.2d at 559.
205. 257 Ga. App. 589, 571 S.E.2d 571 (2002).
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properly denied a motion to recuse despite the fact that the judge was
familiar with the defendant from earlier cases. °6
C.

JudicialFree Speech

In Weaver v. Bonner, °7 a former candidate for the Georgia Supreme
Court successfully challenged two parts of the Georgia Code of Judicial
Conduct. 2 ' The former candidate published campaign literature and
aired television commercials portraying his opponent as a proponent of
same-sex marriage and an opponent of the death penalty.0 9 The
Georgia Judicial Qualifications Commission (JQC) found that these
statements violated Canon 7(B)(1)(d) of the Georgia Code of Judicial
Conduct, which prohibited any communication "'that the candidate
knows or reasonably should know is false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, or which contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law
or omits a fact necessary to make the communication considered as a
whole not materially misleading."'2 10 The JQC eventually issued a
public statement that the
candidate had engaged in deceptive tactics,
211
and the candidate lost.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that
Canon 7(B)(1)(d) violated the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 212 The court of appeals relied in part on Republican
Party v. White, 213 in which, just months before, the United States
Supreme Court struck down a state's ban on judicial candidates
"announcing" their positions on matters of public controversy.214 The
Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia's restrictions on speech during
judicial elections did not give enough "breathing space" for errors in
public debate. 215 The court also struck down Georgia's ban on judicial
candidates soliciting political contributions, holding that this restriction
was not narrowly tailored to serve Georgia's compelling state interest in
judicial impartiality because others could solicit contributions on behalf
of the candidate.21 6 Although the Eleventh Circuit declined to award
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Id. at 590, 571 S.E.2d at 573-74.
309 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 1325.
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Id. at 1321 n.12.
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the plaintiffs damages or a new election,217 the court's decision means
that future judicial elections in Georgia will look and sound more like
other political campaigns than ever before.
VI.

MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS

The Georgia appellate courts decided a number of miscellaneous cases
involving the ethical duties of lawyers and the proper remedies for
violations of these duties. The supreme court had to decide whether a
lawyer or a client owns papers in a client's file, while the court of
appeals dealt with several cases concerning the availability of civil
remedies for alleged ethical violations, two cases about disqualification,
and two cases about alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
In Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers v. Henry,21 the supreme court
confronted a dispute between a client who sought a document in the
client's file and a law firm that declined to provide it. The client hired
the firm to represent him in a dispute. His lawyer tried unsuccessfully
to negotiate a resolution of the dispute. The client later asked the
lawyer to prepare a memorandum about the unsuccessful negotiations.
The lawyer did so but declined to give the memo to the client. The
dispute over the memo eventually reached the supreme court.219 The
court held that in Georgia, a document created by a lawyer belongs to
the client unless the lawyer can show good cause for not giving the client
the document. 22 ' Good cause might exist, for example, if the document
was an assessment of the client.221 The court remanded the case for
a determination whether good cause existed for the lawyer to withhold
the document from the client.222
The court of appeals had to decide in four cases how, if at all, to
remedy alleged violations of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct.223 One case concerned alleged malpractice for withdrawing from
a case. In Patton v. Turnage,22 4 an attorney represented a client (who
was also an attorney) in a divorce action. The client and lawyer
disagreed about how the case should be handled, and the lawyer secured
court permission to withdraw from the case less than one month before

217. Id. at 1325.
218. 276 Ga. 571, 581 S.E.2d 37 (2003).

219. Id. at 571-72, 581 S.E.2d at 38-39.
220. Id. at 574, 581 S.E.2d at 40.
221. Id. at 573, 581 S.E.2d at 39.
222. Id. at 574, 581 S.E.2d at 40.
223.

GEORGIA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,

224.

260 Ga. App. 744, 580 S.E.2d 604 (2003).
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the scheduled trial.225 The court of appeals held that it could not be
malpractice for an attorney to withdraw in accordance with the Rules of
Professional Conduct and with court permission, especially when the
client did not object to the withdrawal at the time.226 This first case
is straightforward because it is not a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct to withdraw, with court permission, when good cause
exists.227
Three cases involved the more difficult question of what remedy is
available in civil litigation for violations of the Rules of Professional
Conduct. In Rice v. Lightmas,22 ' a non-lawyer filed a suit pro se and
on behalf of his wife. His adversary, an attorney, correctly pointed out
that the husband could not represent the wife without a law license.
The trial court remedied this violation by "disqualifying" the husband
and striking his name from the pleadings.2 29 The court of appeals held
this remedy denied the husband his constitutional right to represent
himself and therefore was the wrong remedy for his unauthorized
practice of law. 20 In Griffin v. Fowler,231 a former client sued his
lawyer for malpractice and for breach of fiduciary duty. One basis for
the fiduciary duty claim was that the lawyer charged an excessive fee in
violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct,2" 2 but the court of
appeals held that "a plaintiff cannot base a claim for civil damages solely
on duties imposed by the [Rules] of Professional Conduct."2 3
The
court, however, appeared to reach the opposite conclusion in Willett v.
Stookey. 3 4
In Willett the court disallowed a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty against a lawyer who violated his ethical duty of
confidentiality
solely because the plaintiff could not show any damag2 35
es.
There is no controversy about the remedy when an attorney represents
an opposing party despite a conflict of interest. Disqualification is called
for under these circumstances. In two cases this year, however, the
court of appeals reminded parties that delay can waive this as a basis
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Id. at 744-45, 580 S.E.2d at 604-06.
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for disqualification.
In Head v. CSX Transportation, Inc.,236 the
defendant learned that the plaintiff's counsel had a partner who was
representing the defendant in unrelated litigation.2 "7
Plaintiff's
counsel had a conflict of interest under Georgia Rules of Professional
Conduct 1.7(a) and 1.10(a).23 8 However, the defendant waited until
after the verdict was rendered against him to raise the point. 239 The
court of appeals found the issue to be waived.24 ° Similarly, in Yates v.
Dublin Sir Shop, Inc. ,241 two parties to the suit had been represented
on other matters by a lawyer who formed a partnership with their
adversary's lawyer and even appeared to participate in the trial against
them. The parties waived any claim to disqualify the lawyer by2waiting
42
to raise it until after judgment had been entered against them.
In two cases, the court of appeals dealt with claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. Jackson v. State concerned a claim that an assistant
district attorney had threatened a witness, who then testified against
the defendants."
The court noted that the testimony given by the
witness at trial was perfectly consistent with earlier statements he had
given to the police, and the defendants had ample opportunity to attack
his testimony by cross-examination.24 5 The court rejected the defendant's request for a new trial without deciding whether there was
prosecutorial misconduct.246 Similarly, in State v. Young,247 the court
of appeals reversed a trial court's decision to dismiss an indictment
because a prosecutor allegedly had not lived up to a promise to allow the
defendant to testify before a grand jury.24

The court held that this

promise was not enforceable because there was no consideration for it
but noted that "[wie understand the trial court's concern over the ethical
considerations involved when the State fails to keep its word."249
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Id.
Id. at 731-32, 578 S.E.2d at 301-02.
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CONCLUSION

Legal ethics encompasses a number of topics: from the lawyer's duties
of competence, diligence, confidentiality, and loyalty, to the judge's duties
of impartiality and fairness. As this Article demonstrates, these various
duties arise in a wide array of contexts, including disciplinary cases, civil
litigation, and post-conviction petitions. Lawyers must keep up with
their own duties, just as they keep up with the substantive law in the
areas in which they practice. The purpose of this Article has been to
help Georgia lawyers do just that.
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